Publications by Fellows: Gustavo Venturelli, Paolo Ricci, Gabriel Pinho: Brazil’s Democratic Resilience: How Institutions Withstood Bolsonaro’s Assault

Populist leaders are often framed as menaces to democracy—and for good reason. Brazil under Jair Bolsonaro quickly rose to the top of everyone’s backsliding list, a veritable cautionary tale in the age of eroding norms. Yet Brazilian democracy endured. The story of how it survived offers valuable lessons for democracies everywhere.

On January 1, 2023, Lula da Silva assumed office for his third term as the Brazilian chief executive. The elected president walked into the Palácio do Planalto—the official workplace of the presidency—holding hands with people representing minoritarian social groups in a clear message: Brazilian democracy, after four years of consistent attacks on Indigenous, quilombola, and LGBTQIA+ individuals, respects civil freedoms and rights. A week later, Jair Bolsonaro supporters stormed institutional buildings, causing an estimated $3 million in damages. Their message was equally clear: We do not accept the 2022 election results. In response, and as part of an effort to reaffirm democratic stability, Lula convened the country’s twenty-seven governors just three weeks later and issued a public declaration in defense of democracy. However, the resilience of Brazil’s democratic institutions depended on far more than political statements alone. How did Bolsonaro—a self-styled populist strongman—undermine democratic norms? More importantly, what ultimately prevented democratic collapse?

In this piece, we discuss Bolsonaro’s attack on democracy and argue that two institutions were essential in stopping him in his authoritarian attempts: the Supreme Federal Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal, STF) and the Superior Electoral Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, TSE).

How Bolsonaro Assaulted Democracy

Over the past decade, Brazil has witnessed a troubling erosion of its democratic norms. Through deliberate efforts to undermine checks and balances and sustained attacks on the credibility of Brazil’s electoral system, Bolsonaro’s presidency left behind scars that demand scrutiny. Below, we outline some key episodes illustrating these undemocratic attempts.

The discrediting of electronic voting machines was Bolsonaro’s most explicit attack on electoral institutions. He claimed fraud even in 2018, when he won, insisting he would have been elected already in the first round. Later, Bolsonaro pushed a bill advocating for printed ballots, which was rejected by both Congress and the STF. During the 2022 elections, Federal Police investigations revealed that a Federal Highway Police director had issued orders for targeted roadblocks aimed at preventing citizens from voting, especially in regions where Lula was polling strongly. Bolsonaro’s Minister of Justice, who later ended up imprisoned, was reportedly behind the plan.

When his son, Flávio Bolsonaro, Senator for Rio de Janeiro, was implicated in corruption investigations involving money laundering, Bolsonaro attempted to replace the head of the Federal Police to protect his family. His nominee, Alexandre Ramagem, was a close ally. However, this move triggered the resignation of Sérgio Moro, Bolsonaro’s Minister of Justice and the public face of Operation Car Wash, the anti-corruption crusade between 2014 and 2021, and plunged the government into a crisis. Citing constitutional violations in the appointment of public officials, the STF struck down the nomination.

Another break with post-redemocratization norms was Bolsonaro’s appointment of an unusually high number of military personnel. Brazil has one of the most fragmented parliaments in the world, and to govern effectively, presidents typically build coalitions by offering cabinet positions to parties that support their bills in Congress. Bolsonaro tried to bypass this logic and suffered repeated defeats when negotiating each bill individually. After railing against Brazil’s “coalition presidentialism,” he ultimately gave in and embraced the Centrão[1] in 2020 to secure some measure of governability.

As defeat in the 2022 elections loomed, Bolsonaro made a last-ditch effort. A coup plan was uncovered by the Federal Police involving high-ranking members of his administration. A plea deal by Bolsonaro’s aide, Mauro Cid, revealed a scheme by Bolsonaro and his allies to call for a state of siege if a popular uprising succeeded, aiming to justify new elections. After Lula da Silva’s victory, Bolsonaro refrained from conceding defeat. By all indications, he tried to persuade the leadership of the Armed Forces to back his plan. While the Navy commander reportedly expressed willingness to join, the Army and Air Force commanders stepped back and withheld support.

In his tumultuous relationship with democracy, Bolsonaro attacked electoral and liberal democratic values. His efforts weakened checks and balances, harassed institutions, attacked the media, and ultimately engaged in a plot to overturn an election.

Regarding institutions, his main targets were the STF and TSE, which he sought to undermine through impeachment threats and proposed constitutional changes to the electoral system. While Bolsonaro’s coalition allies, the Congress, and segments of the media occasionally served as counterweights shielding democratic institutions, civil society also played a vital role in resisting his efforts. In August 2022, Brazilians witnessed a remarkable gathering at the University of São Paulo, where academics, business leaders, jurists, and social movements converged in a public demonstration to defend democracy. Yet it was the STF and TSE that ultimately emerged as the most decisive institutional bulwarks in this unfolding story.

How Brazilian Democracy Survived: Militant Democracy and Legal Firewalls

As autocrats chip away at democracies worldwide, a critical question emerges: How can democracy defend itself? One bold—and contentious—answer is “militant democracy,” a strategy that advocates the proactive use of legal tools rather than relying on norms or goodwill alone. It’s about fighting fire with fire—actively blocking those who threaten democracy’s survival.

At its heart, militant democracy argues that democracies cannot afford to be passive. To endure, they must create legal and constitutional safeguards against those who seek to dismantle them from within.

This may, at times, require bending conventional liberal norms. A range of legal tools can fulfill this objective: banning subversive parties and movements, criminalizing incitement to hate or violence, restricting military involvement in politics, and even blocking groups that openly seek to erode democratic institutions.

Brazil’s experience under Bolsonaro illustrates how militant democracy can function in practice. The STF has emerged as the central force containing authoritarian-leaning moves, transforming itself into the frontline in the fight against disinformation and institutional sabotage. Introduced in 2019, the “Fake News Inquiry” was devised to investigate fraudulent stories, slanderous charges, threats, and offenses against STF members, catalyzing a new proactive stance. This shift was evident not only in the substance of court decisions but also in their speed: in 2019, 33.9% of cases received a ruling within the same year, a figure that jumped to 68.5% by 2020.

The TSE likewise stepped up to fend off threats to democracy. In 2022, the court passed a resolution allowing itself to order the removal of disinformation affecting electoral integrity from digital platforms. This new authority enabled swift responses—takedowns of false claims about voting machines, deepfake videos, and smear campaigns against candidates. Although aggressive, the TSE deemed these actions essential to protect electoral integrity. In a landmark decision, the court ruled twice against Bolsonaro in 2023, finding him guilty of abusing power and manipulating media coverage. The verdict was clear: Bolsonaro was banned from running for office until 2030.

These measures exemplified militant democracy’s core logic—deploying extraordinary legal tools to protect democratic regimes. But they also sparked legitimate concerns about judicial overreach. Critics condemned these actions as arbitrary and elitist, citing undefined parameters and the concentration of power in unelected authorities, potentially exacerbating tensions between representative and non-representative institutions.

We partially concur with these critiques. Expanded judicial authority can undermine democratic pluralism and the separation of powers. However, the exceptional nature of these measures suggests that institutions removed from political competition may, under certain circumstances, better preserve democratic values in times of crisis. Their effectiveness, we argue, stems precisely from their extraordinary and time-bound character—not from any desire to permanently expand judicial power.

What can Democracies Learn from Brazil?

Brazil’s experience with democratic resilience in the face of Bolsonaro’s authoritarian tendencies provides valuable insights for democracies worldwide confronting similar challenges. The instrumental role of institutional safeguards—particularly the STF and TSE—demonstrates that robust judicial independence can be a critical bulwark against democratic backsliding.

Despite concerns over concentrating power in unelected bodies, Brazil’s case illustrates how the selective use of “militant democracy” can curb populist threats without permanently distorting the constitutional balance.

Notably, this institutional resistance succeeded where similar efforts in countries like Hungary, Poland, and Turkey have faltered, suggesting that the strength of constitutional courts, their willingness to assert authority in defense of democratic principles, and the timing of their interventions are decisive variables in determining outcomes.

The lessons from Brazil extend beyond institutional design. A truly resilient democracy requires multi-layered defenses. Judicial assertiveness must be complemented by civil society mobilization, media independence, coalition-building among opposition actors, and neutrality of the armed forces.

What, then, should other democracies take from this case? First, constitutional courts must be empowered with sufficient authority and independence to rein in executive overreach. Second, defensive legal measures must remain extraordinary; they should be employed strategically and temporarily, not as permanent expansions of judicial power. Third, and crucially, formal institutional resistance must be reinforced by robust civil society engagement and a democratic culture capable of generating bottom-up pressure.

As democratic erosion continues to threaten political systems globally, Brazil’s strategic institutional resilience offers a template for preservation. It demonstrates that democracy can indeed defend itself when multiple protective mechanisms function in concert, relying on a delicate balance between immediate defensive needs and long-term constitutional integrity.

Gustavo Venturelli is a Postdoctoral Fellow at CEU Democracy Institute, focusing on populism and democratic backsliding in Latin America.

Paolo Ricci is a Professor of Political Science at the University of São Paulo, whose research centers on populism and electoral fraud.

Gabriel Pinho is a PhD Candidate in Political Science at the University of São Paulo, studying democratic resilience with an emphasis on the Brazilian case.

[1] Centrão is this block of parties that are not ideologically coherent and usually support the government in exchange for pork barrel.

 

This essay was originally published in the journal of the CEU Democracy Institute, the Review of Democracy.